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The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law Judge
at the Office of Hearings and Appeals
in the Social Security Administration
Charles N. Bono
I. ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
The role of the Federal Administrative Law Judge is described and
outlined in the Office of Personnel Management Official Position Description
(PD), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Federal Regulations (CFR)
Statutes (USCA), decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts of the
land. It has also been discussed in many Congressional hearings.
The re-engineering proposals, which are the subject of this article, and
the Short Term Disability Project (STDP) recently implemented by Social
Security Administration (SSA) transfer a significant number of the
administrative law judge functions to someone in SSA, other than an APA
protected ALJ, i.e. Senior Staff Attorneys and ultimately Adjudicative
Officers (AO). SSA refers to all such individuals as "adjudicators", as it has
administrative law judges.
Some administrative law judges in SSA were unaware that they had
an official PD. Others were aware they had a PD, but had never taken the
time to read it. Their understanding of their positions in such cases was
based upon their own opinions, and or perhaps what the agency told them
their role and functions were.
Speech presented in Washington DC April 7,1995, by Judge Charles N.
Bono at the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges 20th Annual
Symposium.
Charles N. Bono is an Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Hearings
and Appeals, Social Securty Administration. Judge Bono is a past chair of the
National Conference of Administrative Law Judges and a past president of the
Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. The views and opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the author. They do not represent any official position of
any part of the United States Government.
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The provisions of the APA, the CFR, the USCA and the PD clearly
establish administrative Law Judges as a special protected class of
employees in federal government service. They are employees of the
agency, but their positions carry certain exclusive protection no other
federal employee is granted, and for good reason. Those protection are
designed to afford them decisional and functional independence.
Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was enacted in 1946.
Within the provisions of that legislation, the role of the administrative law
judge is clearly defined, although at that time the hearing examiners or
presiding officers were not titled administrative law judges. It is important to
remember that the Act also provides that such individuals are empowered
to carry out those enumerated functions and that they may not perform
duties inconsistent with those functions. Even if the agency in which they
are employed directs them to carry out duties inconsistent with their roles
as independent decision makers, the Act implies a lack of authority to do
so.
Nine functions of an administrative law judge are set forth in the APA
itself, they are as follows:
1) Administer Oaths and Affirmations;
2) Issue Subpoenas;
3) Rule on Offers of Proof of Evidence;
4) Take Depositions;
5) Regulate the Course of the Hearing;
6) Hold Conferences for settlement of issues;
7) Dispose of Procedural Requests;
8) Make, or recommend decisions;
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9) Take Other Actions Authorized by Agency Rule Consistent with the
subchapter,
Recent amendments to the APA expanded the originally stated
functions to include those involving "alternative dispute resolution"(ADR). It
added two functions connected with ADR that had not previously been
mentioned. Thus, 11 functions of administrative law judges are derived
from the APA.
Official Position Description
The Position Description in SSA expands on the original nine in the
APA to nineteen. That position description was drafted, proposed and
implemented after the approval of it by Office of Personnel Management as
the official position description, as recently as August of 1994. Thus, by
agency rule the position description adopts the APA functions and
expands them to 19. We can now infer those functions to be 21 with the
addition in the APA of the two new functions dealing with alternative
dispute resolution.
The Social Security Administration has promulgated and implemented
regulations, describing what an administrative law judge does, and what an
administrative law judge is empowered to do in the hearings and appeals
process in SSA, specifically 20 CFR Sections 404 and 416. Section 404
dealing with Title II (Disability Insurance Cases), and Section 416, dealing
with Title XVI ( Supplemental Security Income).
Court Decisions
The decisions of the courts have, on many occasions, described the
position and function of the administrative law judges, and their importance
as well. They have expanded the function, duties and responsibilities to the
Fall 1995
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position of administrative law judges, particularly in the case of SSA judges
to evidence gathering functions and record development responsibilities
beyond those usually required of Article III judges. The function and
responsibility of an SSA judge also goes beyond those of administrative law
judges for other agencies who primarily preside over adversary
proceedings where both parties are represented. The additional burdens
placed on the administrative law judge in SSA are dictated by the non-
adversarial nature of the SSA hearings presided over by SSA judges.
The following are a list of cases, addressing the importance of
administrative law judges.
" Ramspeck vs. Federal Tial Examiners Conference 343 U.S. 128
(1953)
" Butz et al vs. Economou 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
* Heckler vs. Campbell 461 U.S. 458 (1983)
* Stieberger vs. Heckler 615 F. Supp. 1315 (D.C.N.Y.) 1985
" Echeveria vs. Secretary 685 F.2d 755 (2nd Circuit) 1982
In the Echeveia case, the court distinguished the difference between
an administrative law judge and a trial judge by stating.
"The administrative law judge, while the functional
equivalent of a trial judge, must obtain evidence to fully
develop the record, and is therefore unlike a trial judge. "
As previously stated, this extra burden of evidentiary development is
dictated by the fact that SSA administrative law judge hearings are non-
adversarial. Past attempts to make them adversarial, both recommended
and in some instances tried by SSA, have met with much opposition and
have failed.
Thus, the SSA judge still carries the burden of both parties, as well as
the judge. This is so even though many of the applicants in such hearings
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are represented by attorneys or other legal representatives. The famous
"Three Hat Theory" is no stranger to any of you, I am sure. It is SSA's
exclusive phenomena.
Important to remember in all of this is that whatever his or her.
functions, and authority as perceived by anyone, the administrative law
judge is empowered to perform only functions consistent with the provisions
of the subchapter in the APA.
Section 3105 of the APA provides an agency may not assign an
administrative law judge any duty inconsistent with the functions so set
forth, and thus an ALJ cannot perform duties or functions inconsistent with
the APA.
This is important to remember. Unfortunately, it is often overlooked
both by the agencies, and even by some of the judges, as will be evident
from some of the events that have occurred in the evolution of the
administrative law judge position in SSA.
With all of the particular descriptions of functions, duties,
responsibilities of SSA administrative law judges, there is an overriding role
of SSA ALJs, which was described by Senator William Cohen of Maine
June 8, 1983, at hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management. The topic of that hearing was the role of the
administrative law judge in SSA. He stated:
"The ALJ has the dual responsibility of protecting the
claimants rights and at the same time of insuring that benefits
are not paid to those who fail to meet the requirements of the
law."
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
POSITION IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Let us go back 49 years - that should be enough history of the
evolution.
Fall 1995
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In 1946 when the APA, was passed, individuals working for federal
agencies who held hearings, and made decisions were not called
administrative law judges.
They were referred to as trial examiners, referees, presiding officers,
or hearing examiners. There was no uniformity in the titles utilized by the
agencies for such positions. Additionally, some of the decision makers
made only recommended decisions, while others made final decisions,
subject only to agency head reversal.
Whatever the agencies chose to call such individuals, there were
problems. The APA was passed in part to address long standing problems
in the manner and method in which agencies were utilizing the people that
held these positions, held hearings and made decisions, either final or
recommended. Being employees of the agencies, with no evident
protection from agency pressure, the public was justifiably suspicious of
their impartiality.
There were those who advocated removing the hearing examiners
from the employment of the agencies to solve the problems, which seemed
to be connected to the administrative oversight control the agencies had of
them. The agencies opposed such suggestions, even as they do today
when passage of a separate unified corps of administrative law judges is
considered.
How could the agency be sure agency policy was followed, if cases
were decided by other than those expert with the subject matter, and in
touch with the agency itself as being one of it's employees? The
controversy of whether agency policy or the law prevailed. The agencies
believed unless the decision makers were in their employment and had the
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specialized experience necessary they would not enforce agency policy.
The issue was one of control, no matter what they called it.
The compromise struck with passage of the APA was to leave the
examiners in the employment of the various federal agencies, so that
agency policy could be observed. Additional provisions were made for their
insulation from agency pressure and control in performance of their
functions and in decision making. The idea was to give them both functional
and decisional independence, even though they continued to be employees
of the agency.
The provisions of the APA were thus designed to insulate the position
from the agency control that had led to a public mistrust of administrative
law hearings in the agencies. The APA was praiseworthy legislation. In the
perception of the public it caused an immediate improvement over what
had been. Clearly, it may have been more naive than effective, as
subsequent events would demonstrate in SSA.
Provisions designed to insulate the position contained in the APA,
position descriptions and regulations are the following:
1) Cases were to be assigned in strict rotation, wherever practical.
(This prevented hearing examiner shopping by the agency, which
could determine the outcome of the case by simply picking the trial
examiner who was more disposed to take the agency position).
2) Performance evaluations of the position were prohibited.
Standards for removal were different, therefore, for these positions
than any other in government service. For instance, efficiency of
the service standard could not be applied or found to be good
cause for the removal of anyone holding these positions. (In this
manner the decision makers were protected from agency threats
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of removal on the basis of efficiency, or refusal to follow agency
directives).
3) The official position descriptions reflected the protected nature of
the position by providing, as in the SSA PD specifically that such
employees were subject only to general office management
supervision, and that they performed their duties and
responsibilities under the APA.
Improved status of the position, the examiner was one of the major
goals of the APA, without doubt. In Universal Camera Corp. vs. National
Labor Relations Board 340 U.S. 474,494-5 (1954) it was stated:
... enhancement of the status and functions of the trial
examiner was one of the important purposes of the movement
for administrative reform ..... Section 11 of the APA contains
detailed provisions designed to maintain high standards of
independence and competence in examiners. "
In Federal Trial Examiners Conference vs. Ramspeck 345 U.S. 128
144 (1953) the court stated:
"The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to give
trial examiners in the various administrative agencies a new
status of freedom from agency control. Henceforth they were
to be very nearly the equivalent to judges, even though
operating within the Federal system of administrative justice".
Indeed Section 11 of the APA was referred to as a Federal Bill of
Rights for federal hearing examiners. A reading of it clearly justifies such a
conclusion as it provides:
* examiners are to assigned cases in rotation ( as far as practicable);
* examiners shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and
responsibilities as hearing examiners;
" shall be removable only for "good cause" established by the Civil
Service Commission;
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" only after an opportunity for an oral hearing and upon the record
thereof;,
* shall receive compensation prescribed by the commission
independently of agency recommendations or ratings;
These protections are for the most part reflected in the official position
description of SSA judges. Congressional intent was clear. Congress
wanted to change the employee status of the hearing examiners position
from an unprotected position, to a protected position. By doing this
Congress hoped it would allay concerns that there was no justice in
administrative hearings before agency employees who by reason of their
employment position appeared to be subject to decisional control by the
agency. They wanted to eliminate the "palace guard" perception. So as we
can see the role of the examiner as employee of the agencies, evolved by
reason of the APA into a protected position. Often it is heard that such
protections are not for the judges. Whether they are or not is immaterial.
The protections are necessary to insure the citizenry of fairness.
The Social Security Act itself requires the determination of disability
claims on the record, after an opportunity for an agency hearing and thus
the protection of the APA clearly applies. The APA does not require an
agency to provide a hearing, but when by law or policy it does so, the
hearing provided must be by an APA protected indMdual if not the head of
the agency itself.
The Secretary or head of the agency may hold the hearing itself and
indeed has the authority to hold hearings, but the APA provides that, if that
authority is delegated, it must be delegated to an APA protected hearing
examiner, trial examiner, whatever the title is. (Borg-Johnson Electronics
Fall 1995
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Inc. vs. Robert K Christenberry Postmaster, NY.N.Y. U.S.D.C.) 169
F.Supp 746)
In the PD of the SSA'administrative law judges the Secretary directly
delegates the authority of her office to the administrative law judge to hold
the hearing. SSA is not mentioned as derivative delegate, or otherwise. In
fact, while the judge is the employee of the Social Security Administration,
he or she is the Secretary's delegate and holds such hearings under the
provisions of the APA.
In my opinion the newly established independent Social Security
Administration headed by a Commissioner therefore will predictably have to
delegate her authority to the administrative law judges as the Secretary has
historically done, and may not delegate such authority to non-ALJs or
employees who do not fall under the protection of the APA, any more than
the Secretary could have.
In this way it can be assured that the person, other than the Secretary
or Commissioner deciding the case, or recommending a decision in the
case is impartial and independent. Of course the Secretary or other head of
the agency may not accept the decision of the independent delegate, but it
does not change, in my opinion, the fact that the power delegated must be
to an APA protected individual to conduct the hearing or any other
procedure involved in the case after a request for hearing has been filed.
Recent developments have raised concerns that SSA is questioning
the necessity of an APA hearing, and indeed has made references to
SSA's only adopting the APA model as an optional one. This will be
discussed later.
In 1972 the title of hearing examiners was by official act of Congress
changed to "Administrative Law Judge". This was a further indication of
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Congressional intent to emphasize the importance of the position. In effect
it was a restatement that agencies holding hearings must not only utilize
independent hearing examiners, but their titles should be changed to truly
reflect the importance of their position as judges and their actual
independence.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION - ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES EVOLUTION
"A DIFFERENT STORY FROM THE REST"
In 1975 an increasing volume of applications for disability, and
requests for hearings before administrative law judges, due in part to SSAs
having agreed to take on the additional burden of hearing Black Lung
Cases for the Labor Department, raised concern.
Congressional Hearings in 1975 addressed the concerns about the
growing backlog of disability cases in the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
of the Social Security Administration. 1 The number of cases on hand
causing the concern was reportedly 113,000. cases. That number is a long
way from the reported 500,000 cases reported today.
James B. Cardwell, the then Commissioner of Social Security,
promised Congress additional staff would be hired to help the judges, that
judges would be freed up to hear and decide more cases by removing from
them certain administrative functions, and that additional equipment and
other resources would be added to the hearing offices.
He also announced an" Informal Remand" process designed to send
certain profile cases, much as the profiles presently being designed to be
1 "Delays in Social Security Appeals" Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives
94th Congress, First Session, Sept. 19, 26; Oct. 3, 20, 1975. U.S. Gov. Printing
Office, 59-762-0.
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utilized in the proposals of re-engineering, back to the state agencies to be
re-evaluated to see if they could be allowed without a hearing.
The cases while physically sent back remained on the docket of the
appeals office, and were included in the offices case count. That remand
program proved to be unsuccessful for the most part and the major effect
of the program was to delay the hearing and decision in the case.
In the present Short-Term Disability Project (STDP) implementation a
similar plan is implemented. This time it is called a "re-reconsideration
determination", as it is not informally remanded anywhere but stays in the
hearing office.
He praised a newly appointed Director of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals Robert Trachtenberg who he credited with reducing a previous
backlog of 113,000 cases to 107,000 cases. He didn't specify what Mr.
Trachtenberg had done to accomplish this, but later events were to prove a
new era was dawning for the role of the administrative law judge.
At the same time he expressed his concern that the allowance rate of
disability applications at the hearing level presided over by the
administrative law judges had risen to an unprecedented 50 %. He was
concerned by what he perceived to be a lack of "consistency" in the
application of the law evidenced by a high allowance rate at the hearings
and appeals level by the administrative law judges, as compared to the low
allowance rates at the earlier stages of initial and reconsideration
determination level.
This inconsistency he blamed on the hearings and appeals process.
He promised Congress that SSA was taking steps to correct this
inconsistency, and mounting allowance rate among the judges. This same
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Commissioner in a Federal Times article published in July 1976 entitled
"Meet the Candid Bureaucrat', expressed his displeasure with the judges.2
He indicated in that article that he would just as soon do away with
administrative law judges in the hearings and appeals process. He
complained that they were too unpredictable and had to many "judicial
trappings", whatever that may have meant. He felt that Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals, now Office of Hearings and Appeals, had strayed too far from
the parental unit. He expressed a desire to replace them with pre-APA
presiding officers who would be more in tune with "agency policy".
Mr. Trachtenberg, the newly appointed Director of the Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, and the one that Commissioner Cardwell praised so
much, expressed no such desire to eliminate the judges at the hearings in
1975. Rather, he assured Congress he was implementing other
procedures to increase the production of the administrative law judges. One
of them was setting of numerical goals in decisions per month per judge to
be met by the judges and that he was relying upon the judges to solve the
mounting case load problem.
He was questioned by Congressman Archer with respect to the
propriety of setting production guidelines for judges. Mr. Trachtenberg
admitted that he was setting numerical goals for the judges to meet in
monthly dispositions, but defended the practice stating:
" I don't think the setting of goals and finite quotas are the same thing.
What we have I think any organization needs. You need to shoot for a
goal".
He also assured the committee that the management efforts he had
started were designed to get the AU to his high water mark, and he
2 "Meet the Candid Bureaucrat." Federal Times, July 16, 1976.
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assured Congress they were responding adequately and there was no
problem. He had instituted a practice of setting a certain number of
dispositions and hearings to- be accomplished by each judge each month
as goals and was content that the judges would accomplish them.
The goal in numbers he set was 26 per month per judge, although he
had stated that 20 decisions per month per judge even with a staff attorney
to help draft decisions was a "heavy load". Obviously the numerical goal
was arrived at by simply dividing the number of cases by the number of
judges on hand and not based on any other factors.
Besides setting what he called goals, he instituted tracking procedures
to record the judges indMdual production and then compared it to other
judges, offices, and to what was determined to be a national average which
was simply arrived at by dividing the number of cases disposed of by the
number of judges. This was his management style.
He assured the subcommittee "They ( the ALJS) know what the crisis
is and they are responding without the need for finite quotas where you
"bang people over the head to meet them." His management style and
introduction of the numerical goals were to cause the judges to respond in a
much different way than he expected.
While he assured the Congressional subcommittee in 1975 that he did
not think in any judicial system numerical quotas....are adequate or
appropriate, because they tend to interfere with due process", he had
nonetheless established numerical goals that many judges and other
interpreted as being quotas. Much unrest and conflict in Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals between the judges on the one hand and the agency
management officials on the other ensued. Later continuing tension
between agency administrators and the judges was a direct result of the
numerical goal setting and the management style of the agency that made
the distinction between goals and quotas meaningless.
SSA ALJS SUE AGENCY
In 1977 this tension resulted in a lawsuit being filed in Kansas City,
Missouri by five administrative law judges assigned to the Kansas City
hearing office, I was one of them. Filed in the United States District Court in
the Western District of Missouri it sought declaratory judgment and relief
from the numerical goal setting, failure of the agency to assign cases in
rotation, establishment of rating and evaluating mechanisms of individual
performance of administrative law judges.
3
In 1979, while this case was pending trial, Congressional hearings into
the unrest in the agency resulted in the publishing of a survey and issue
paper by the Staff of the Subcommittee on Social Security.4 The
conclusion was stated in the report that the agency, because of these
management tactics, and goal setting in numbers had become an agency
at war with itself, and that the emphasis under Mr. Trachtenberg's
management had been more to quantity then to quality and that the quality
of justice had suffered.
In July 1979 the Kansas City litigation was settled by agreement
between the agency and the parties and in that settlement the agency
agreed not to set quotas, and or goals in numbers of cases to be
scheduled, heard or decided in given periods of time, assign cases in strict
3 Charles N. Bono et al. vs. United States of America. United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division Civil Action No. 77-
0819-CV-4.
4 .Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper,"
Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives 96th Congress, First Session. U.S. Gov. Printing Office
WMCP 96-2.
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rotation, re-assign cases only with the consent of the judge who was
originally assigned the case, abandon a criticized quality review system that
would have permitted the agency to rate and evaluate the individual
performance of administrative law judges, shelved a proposed hearing
office manager position that would have permitted removal of control of the
staff from the judges to a management official. This case as settled came
to be known as the "Bono Settlement'. It bears my name by reason of the
alphabet. I am nonetheless proud that it does.
As the result of the settlement agreement, the case was dismissed,
and the agency appeared to back off of the former management practices
for a while. It moved both the Regional Chief Judge of the Kansas City
Region, who Trachtenberg had referred to as the most effective numerical
goal enforcer, and the Director of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
Robert Trachtenberg, the author of the criticized numerical goal setting
from their jobs to other positions in SSA.
A succession of Associate Commissioners followed heading up the
Office of Hearings and Appeals. First Donald Gonya, then Andrew Young,
then Frank L. Smith, then Louis B. Hayes, then Eileen Bradley, and finally
the present Associate Commissioner Daniel Skoler succeeded to the office.
BONO SETTLEMENT -- DID IT HOLD ?
Many questions were to follow whether or not the agency was, in fact,
following the terms of the settlement agreement. Attempts at interpreting
the terms of the settlement, which were simple enough to need no
interpretation, indicated the agency was having difficulty living with the
agreement it had entered into.
As early as 1980 the agency management officials began questioning
the meaning of the settlement terms seeking to re-interpret the terms of the
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agreement. In many instances the judges themselves, some of them being
judges in charge of the offices failed to abide by the terms of the agreement
and conducted business as usual. The settlement agreement that was to
be the solution to the tension was often observed in the breach and the
tension continued. Some offices were assigning cases in rotation, some
were not. Numerical goals in performance for individual judges were
continued as a management policy.
THE CARTER ERA TERM LIMITS
A new challenge to the existence of the federal administrative judiciary
was presented to the administrative law judge position during the Carter
administration. It was for a time to divert the attention of the judges. A bill
was proposed in Congress to limit the appointment of administrative law
judges to a ten year term, with re-appointment at the discretion of the
agency. This was opposed in most circles, and particularly because it
permitted the agencies to decide whether or not to permit a judge to serve
a second term. The proposed legislation failed for obvious reasons.
But it was also during the Carter administration that concern was again
raised in Congress about the difference in allowance rates between the
initial and reconsideration determination and that occurring at the
administrative law judge level. As early as 1975, SSA was concerned
about a 50% allowance rate. That percentage was steadily increasing. The
state agencies steadfastly maintained that there determinations were 97
percent accurate, so how was it possible that the judges were allowing so
many cases they had denied?
The answer was obvious, the judges were applying the law and the
regulations to the facts of the case, new evidence was also considered.
The state agencies on the other hand were operating by policy manuals
Fall 1995
XV Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 213
that often did not reflect the state of the law and often had nothing to do
with the law. It was like comparing apples with oranges and everyone knew
it. SSA, nonetheless, was instructed in the legislation to conduct a study to
explain the difference and report back to Congress. That portion of the
legislation came to be referred to as the Bellmon amendment.
It was in this same time period that Government Accounting Office
issued a report indicating many people were on the disability roles that
should not be as their cases had never been re-examined by SSA once
they were allowed benefits. Congress became concerned with the number
of people on the disability roles and the fact that SSA was not re-examining
their disability status once they were placed on the roles. Legislation to
encourage SSA to re-visit cases every three years was passed and the
resulting program was called Continuing Disability Review (CDR). Thus, the
seeds for the later Bellmon Review, and the Continuing Disability Review
that were to bloom during the Reagan administration were planted. Those
seeds were to bear bitter fruit for the administrative law judge system in
SSA
THE REAGAN ERA
In 1980 with the election of President Reagan a new Associate
Commissioner Louis B. Hayes was appointed to run what was now re-titled
the "Office of Hearings and Appeals", it was no longer a Bureau. It was a
sign that the autonomous structure of the hearings and appeals system
was ended, and that the mission of Commissioner Cardwell to bring the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals back into the parental fold was beginning.
It was clear that the new Associate Commissioner had read only part
of the settlement agreement as his management style was to renew setting
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of numerical goals, as if the agency had never agreed to stop that practice
and had only agreed not to set quotas.
All types of artifices of interpretation were employed to excuse this
obvious violation of the settlement agreement when it was pointed out that
the settlement agreement specifically prohibited setting numerical goals as
well as quotas to be performed by the judges. When challenged the agency
would assert the goals were office goals, and not individual AU goals. It
was obviously not an office goal, and an individual goal for each judge to
meet, and to achieve on the average nationally.
In appearance before Congress in 1982 to address what was a
steadily increasing backlog, despite the agencies claim that they had freed
judges from ministerial tasks, added support staff, and equipment, Mr.
Hayes told them the judges could and would produce 45 decisions per
month. Again,' the figure was arrived at by simply dividing the number of
cases on hand by the number of judges on hand. So in a span of 6 years
the "goal" which was no "goar or quota, which was no quota was raised
from 26, then to 37, and then promised to be 45.
The management style of the agency reverted to what it had been in
the Trachtenberg years. Indeed, Mr. Hayes performance plan and one
upon which he would be evaluated indicated he had to increase the
production of the individual judges.
Even more elaborate tracking systems of individual judges
performance resulted, with in many instances less than diplomatic feed
back to the judges. To compound this re-appearing problem, rotational
assignment was again deviated from in many instances, travel policies
were again established setting a minimum number of cases that had to be
scheduled for hearing in a given period of time.
Fall 1995
XV Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 213
CONTINUING DISABILITY REVIEW PROGRAM
ACCELERATION DISASTER
Mixed in with all of this resurrection of the same problems was the
compounding problem created by the Continuing Disability Review Program
(CDR). President Reagan, by executive memorandum, in his zeal to show
what he could do accelerated the review program by one year to take place
in 1981, rather than 1982. Later SSA was to be blamed for the
acceleration, as if the President had nothing to do with it, but it was his
action that prompted SSA to accelerate the program of review.
Unprepared to do it right, SSA blundered into removing hundreds of
thousands of people off of the disability roles, and increased enormously
the case load at the hearings and appeals level. The press had a field day
with the horror stories that came out of that ill advised acceleration and the
judges were right in the middle of a very bad situation
The overwhelming number of appeals from such CDI actions further
aggravated the backlog, which in turn prompted more and more pressures
on the judges to decide more cases and to meet the agencies numerical
goals, which were in reality quotas once again.
Alarmed the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight Of Government
Management held hearings in May of 1982. 5 Senator Cohen spoke of
reports from all over the country of truly disabled individuals being dropped
from the program.
Senator Levin of Michigan described the whole procedure as a
debacle, and called for a halt immediately stating "We in the Congress and
the Social Security Administration should admit we made a mistake". He
5 .Oversight of Social Security Disability Benefits Terminations," Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 97th Congress, Second Session,
May 25,1982. U.S. Gov. Printing Office 97-866-0.
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further stated "requiring reviews is fine; it's appropriate. But not unless and
until, there is a fair system in place."
SSA judges had to deal with this crisis, until sometime in 1983 when
the Secretary of Health and Human Services did, in effect, admit a mistake
was made and issued a moratorium of the cessations, putting thousands of
people back on the disability rules by administrative fiat.
SSA FILES MSPB CHARGES
In 1982, while all of the CDI problems were swiriing around the SSA
judges, Associate Commissioner Louis B. Hayes directed that charges for
removal be filed against three administrative law judges with the Merit
Systems Protection Board, and the charge was failing to achieve a
production goal of 20 decisions per month. Thus, the finite numerical quota
was a reality. The numerical goal had been tumed into a quota by making
failure to meet it a ground for discharge from the ALJ position.
Mr. Trachtenberg himself admitted finite quotas would be an interference
with due process. 6
1983 SENATE HEARINGS
In June of 1983 a hearing was held before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs in the United States Senate, previously referred to.7 The purpose of
the hearing was to examine the problem of the CDR Social Security
6 .Delays in Social Security Appeals" Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives
94th Congress, First Session, Sept. 19, 26; Oct. 3, 20, 1975. U.S. Gov. Printing
Office, 59-762-0.
7 'Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative Law
Judge," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 98th
Congress, First Session, June 8, 1993. U.S. Gov. Printing Office 24-067-0.
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Disability Reviews and particularly "The Role of the Administrative Law
Judge".
In the commencement of the hearing Senator Cohen stated that the
agency had indeed established a production goal of 45 decisions per month
per administrative law judge and even identified judges who were low
producers and proceeded to counsel and retrain them to increase their
productivity.
He also discussed in his opening the Bellmon Review procedure
whereby the agency was identifying high allowing judges and attempting to
modify their behavior. He concluded that all of these practices once again
raised troubling questions and they were delved into at that hearing.
Nothing came of the hearings however, aside from a public airing of the
problems and it is not revealed what if anything the subcommittee did about
the problems they discovered as the result of the hearing.
ASSOCIATION VS. HECKLER
The problems continued unabated. In September 1983, the
Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc., a voluntary membership
organization consisting of approximately 500 administrative law judges
employed by HHS filed an action for declaratory judgment and relief against
the agency for violations of the Bono settlement, removal of supervision
and control of support staff.8
Shortly after the case was filed Associate Commissioner Louis B.
Hayes issued a memorandum to the judges announcing a "Bellmon
Review" of judges who had allowed more than 66 2/3 % of their cases as it
was determined that these judges in allowing more than that percentage
8 Association vs. Heckler, U.S.D.C.D.C. 620 F. Supp. 1132, 1984.
were aberrational and needed to be studied to determine how to counsel
them.
Certain judges had been selected and notified to appear for
"counseling". The judges who were about to be "counseled" called upon the
Association for help and their cause was included in the litigation. The court
issued a protective order and the judges never had to appear for their
behavior modification training, but the issue of Bellmon Review remained.
So not only was it obvious to the judges that they had a numerical
quota to meet, but a new twist had been added to caution them that if they
allowed to many cases, as compared to the national average, they would
be identified, and counseled. It was later in the trial of the case learned that
in the performance plan of the Associate Commissioner Louis B. Hayes,
one of his charges was to reduce the allowance rate overall in the hearings
and appeals system.
The case was tried for two weeks, taken under advisement by the
court, and pending the decision the agency announced by memorandum to
the judges that it was discontinuing Bellmon Review. The case was
dismissed in 1985 by the court on the basis that the issue was moot, that
the Association had reformed the agency, and attorneys fees were paid by
the agency.
The cases filed against the three judges with MSPB for failure to meet
production standards were ultimately unsuccessful and the MSPB refused
to accept the recommended decision of the MSPB AU who heard the two
cases Goodman, and Balaban. The efforts of the agency to establish
performance standards in numbers, thus failed.
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DISABILITY REFORM LEGISLATION 1984
The Disability Reform Legislation of 1984 was passed with particular
mention of directing the agency to establish uniform standards at all levels
of determination, do better medical development of evidence in the cases,
re-examine the "non-acquiescence" policy of the agency which permitted
the agency to ignore court interpretations of the law.
Unfortunately, the continuing problems of the judges in this scenario
were ignored by Congress and no solution to those continuing problems
was included in the legislation. The legislation just made the burden of the
ALJs heavier by making the development of the evidence even more time
consuming, and gave them no relief from the pressures the agency was
putting on them.
The agency continued to pursue numerical goal setting for the judges,
although Louis B. Hayes was replaced as Associate Commissioner by
Frank L. Smith, his tenure resulted in the discontinuation of Bellmon, but
finalized plans the agency had been pursuing to "poor' the employees,
formerly assigned to judges, and removing from the judges their authority to
direct and control the processing of the cases in a system which has come
to be known as "reconfiguration."
The court in the Association case previously mentioned did not take up
the issue of reconfiguration or the violations of the Bono settlement,
because it determined those matters would have to be pursued in the court
that approved the settlement agreement in 1979.
Congress did nothing in the Disability Reform legislation to resolve the
problems the judges were having. Whatever violations of the Bono
settlement and the APA were they remained unresolved.
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Time was to prove the agency did not take the necessary steps to
reform the initial and reconsideration determination stages to insure that the
decisions at those levels were in keeping with the law and interpretation of
the courts.
ABA AWARD TO JUDGES IN 1986
In August 1986, an unprecedented award from the President of the
American Bar Association was presented to the Social Security
Administrative Law Judge Corps, which was received by the Association of
Administrative Law Judges on their behalf. I had the honor to be there and
receive the award on behalf of the Corps as Immediate Past President of
the Association together with others representing the Association.
The language of the award bears repeating:
"For its outstanding efforts during the period from 1982-1984 to protect
the integrity of Administrative Adjudication within their agency to preserve
the publics confidence in the fairness of governmental institutions and to
uphold the rule of law."
The award was given in recognition of the Association's efforts in
redressing the wrongs of the CDI program and opposing efforts of the
agency to set numerical quotas and instituting measures to make certain
judges reduce their allowance rate under the guise of the Bellmon Review.
In spite of the accolades and recognition incident to the award, the
problems of the administrative law judges in SSA in major part remain
unresolved. The agency continues to move cases based upon numerical
goal setting, travel requirements have been implemented requiring judges
to schedule a certain number of cases in given periods of time. Now,
although the judges national average production has risen from 37 to 45, a
tremendous backlog has continued and is reaching crisis proportions. Most
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recently the agency has announced a new numerical goal of 50 decisions
per month per judge.
1988 SOCIAL SECURITY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE RULES AT
HEARING LEVEL FAIL
A draft proposal of SSA regulations, designed to drastically change the
hearings and appeals procedure was about to be published in 1988. The
details of the draft were disclosed in a New York Times article and a public
outcry ensued.
A hearing before the full House and Ways Committee was called.
Changes that included strict evidentiary rules to be applied at the hearing
level were advocated in the proposed rules. Limitation of the issues to be
considered on appeal was also dictated. Evidence was to be required in
seven days before the hearing. Harsh penalties for failing to supply
evidence within the allotted time were also provided.
A part of that proposal provided for delegation of administrative law
judges authority to staff attorneys to hold pre-hearing conferences, limit
issues, gather evidence etc. Striking similarities to parts of the Short Term
Disability Project now being proposed and the proposals for an adjudicative
officer in the overall plan are evident.
Dorcas Hardy, the then Commissioner of Social Security caught by the
public outcry and Congressional criticism of the changes by at least 35
Senators who wrote to President Bush to repudiate the policy changes,
asserting surprise, claiming to have no knowledge of the draft, and rejecting
the draft proposal, preventing their publication in the regulations as final
rules. She stated as her reason for withdrawal that the draft proposal "did
not meet her criteria of making the system " more equitable,
compassionate and efficient'.
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Interesting to note is the fact that SSA by this draft proposal attempted
to change the hearings and appeals process drastically, but seemingly
continued to ignore any needed reform at the initial and reconsideration
determination level.
UNIFIED CORPS, THE ANSWER ?
Primarily because of the problems experienced in SSA, legislation has
been proposed year after year in Congress since the early 1980s to
establish a unified corps of administrative law judges removing all
administrative law judges from employment of individual agencies.
In 1988 hearings were held before the subcommittee on Administrative
Law and Govemmental Relations of the Judiciary Committee on the U.S.
House of Representatives with regard to such proposal.9
Most recently in the 1994 session of Congress it actually passed the
Senate and then it stopped. It is as far as the proposed legislation has
gone. Supporters of that legislation have argued that it will solve the
problem, such as SSA demonstrates, and by establishing a separate corps
run by judges, remove the pressures from the judges which are so rampant
and obviously agency management driven.
Unfortunately, in the progress of the legislation its provisions have
changed and the present proposed bill that passed the Senate includes
authority for systems very similar to those employed by SSA, such as
performance and evaluation systems, efficiency standards, and objected to
as interfering with due process. For many years the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) has been asserting that productivity norms,
9 'Administrative Law Judge Corps Act," Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 1554 and H.R. 2726, U.S. House of Representatives 100th Congress,
Second Session, Mar. 17,1988. U.S. Gov. Printing Office 97-866-0.
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production standards and efficiency rules should be imposed on the judges
in SSA.
In 1992 the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
created a firestorm by following suit and implying that the APA and statutes
shouid be amended to permit employing agencies to impose standards of
performance on judges.1° The drummings for moving back the clock to a
point prior to the passage of APA has had it's effect in this proposed
legislation, resulting in the amendments, and make the legislation as
presently amended and as passed by the Senate extremely suspect.
Provisions of the unified corps legislation have been amended from the
original proposals that required management of the Corps by judges to
permit the separate corps to once again be managed and run by non-
judges or non-APA protected employees (referred to as "persons learned in
law").
Additionally, it is apparent that the re-engineering proposals raise
questions as to whether SSA will continue to use APA judges. Some see in
the re-engineering proposals an agenda to move SSA from reliance on
administrative law judges, so that if a unified corps is a reality, SSA just
wont send any cases to it.
PROBLEMS IN SSA FOR ALJS CONTINUE 1990 HEARINGS
REGARDING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
On June 13, 1990 hearings before the subcommittee on Social
Security of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
representatives commenced regarding the "Judicial Independence of
10 Recommendation 92-7 as adopted by the Plenary Session of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, Dec. 10, 1992.
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Administrative Law Judges At The Social Security Administration" were
held.
The subcommittee's concern was with Office of Hearings and Appeals
management policies that judges were complaining about and referred to a
GAO report entitled "Many ALJs Oppose Productivity Initiatives."'"
Performance Targets, Organizational Structure, support staff problems
were all examined. The hearing confirmed that a controversy was
continuing regarding monthly disposition goals, that staff reductions had
adversely affected OHAs ability to deal with the mounting case load.
The pages of that Congressional hearing confirmed the problems
continued unabated, regardless of the present Commissioner Gwendolyn
King's assurances to the subcommittee that steps were being taken to
resolve the problem.
She went on record, as Commissioner's before her had opposing any
thought of moving the judges out of SSA. No report of findings of that
hearing have ever to my knowledge been issued, nor did the subcommittee
take any public action to resolve the problems it discovered.
Subsequently she issued a memorandum suspending all job
performance reviews in SSA based upon numeric criteria such as numbers
of cases processed in given periods of time. Her intent was to address
criticism of the agency for numerical performance standards. Ironically,
although job performance reviews based upon such criteria are enjoying a
moratorium in other levels of SSA, the numerical performance goals by
11 "Judicial Independence of Administrative Law Judges at the Social Security
Administration," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 101st Congress,
Second Session, June 13,1990. Serial 101-117.
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individual ALJ continued in Office of Hearings and Appeals because they
were not supposed to have performance evaluations anyway.
1992 GAO REPORT CAUSES TROUBLE
In April 1992 the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report
entitled "Racial Differences in Disability Decisions Warrant Further
Investigation." A Sept. 1992 Senate hearing delving into the particulars of
that report quickly discovered that the GAO report did not establish racial
bias, and that no case had been made against SSA ALJs.
The emphasis of that hearing shifted not to racial bias of judges, which
the GAO report did not provide an empirical basis for, but to allegations of
certain SSA ALJs misconduct in the conduct of the proceedings before
them. Allegations of discourtesy to bias on the basis of agency partiality
were alleged by certain Legal Aid Societies who were displeased with
judges who denied too many of the cases, in their opinion.
Senator Levin of Maine expressed concern about what the agency
was going to do about complaints of misconduct, and whether the
mechanism for handling these complaints was effective. A mechanism for
complaints has always been existent and had over the years been used by
individuals who felt they had something to complain about, but the agency
argued they were helpless to deal with complaints because of the protected
nature of the judges position.
Because of Senator Levin's expressed concern, SSA subsequently
established a new complaint procedure, going so far as to post in the office
that, if anyone had a complaint against a judge they had forms that they
would be supplied. No other employee was so identified as far as complaint
procedures were concerned. This procedure of publicly advising people in
advance of the hearing that they could file a complaint against a judge who
was discourteous or who they felt was unfair set the stage for further
problems for the judges in SSA, and was objected to by many judges.
Announcing a complaint department just for the judges seemed a little
much in the minds of many judges.
CODE OF CONDUCT
In October 1992 the Division of Regulations and Rulings of the Social
Security Administration drafted and distributed a proposed regulatory
publication to establish a "Code of Conduct" for SSA ALJs. Various
concerns were raised about the proposed code at that time. There was no
clear showing of why a separate code of conduct was needed for ALJs, as
the agency had always argued that SSA ALJS were subject to the ABA
Model Code of Conduct for Judges and had even cited it in Merit Systems
Protection Board arguments.
Various issues of directive authority of administrative manager judges
were also presented in the proposed code, and judges were concerned that
the passage of such a code would subject them to supervision and
direction in the performance of their judicial functions by Chief judges, which
would have been contrary to their protected status in the performance of
their judicial functions.
Although put on the shelf for a time, most recently in March of 1995 a
new Draft of a proposed Code of Conduct has been prepared which has
been sent to be cleared for publication in the regulations. That new
proposed Code has some features the first one did not have, and
importantly makes mention of the Unified Corps Bill S.486 and includes in
the code of conduct efficiency of case management and extent of
cooperation with administrative directives as a criteria for misconduct.
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Some see this development as permitting establishment of "efficiency
of the service" standards for administrative law judges in SSA, which has
heretofore been prohibited by federal regulations as the basis for discipline
or removal.
RE..ENGIAJEERAIG OR REHASH
To all of this was added the Clinton administration's call to re-engineer
or re-invent government. It provided SSA with the opportunity to address
the many problems in SSA with regard to the disability program.
Congressional hearings had accorded SSA with an F grade in the
administration of disability claims, and thus it was obvious that reform was
needed.
When President Clinton was the Governor of Arkansas in 1983 he
appeared at a hearing of the subcommittee on aging of the House Ways
and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives addressing
"Social Security Disability Reviews, A Federally Created State Problem" 12
He pointed to problems in SSA at that time other than the CDI
disaster. He said:
"I think that SSA should be held accountable to the law in
a manner that all other agencies are ..... it appears to me that
DDS for it's disability determinations relies on the policy
operation management systems, or POMS."
The Social Security Administration did not follow the Administrative
Procedures Act in promulgating POMS; it is not accessible or available to
the public. It was never published for comment. Obviously DDS's review is
based on POMS compliance.... Even worse as I am sure you know and as
12 Social Security Disability Reviews: A Federally-Created State Problem,"
Hearing before the Select Committee on Aging, U.S. House of Representatives98th Congress, Second Session, June 20, 1983. Comm. Pub. No. 98-395, U.S.Gov. Printing Office 24-760-0.
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the record has already been made, SSA has to some extent ignored
federal court decisions.
Hearings were held on April 14, 1994, before the subcommittee on
Social Security of the House Ways and Means Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives.1 3 The subject of the hearing was the proposal
of re-engineering published by SSA. At this hearing Commissioner Shirley
Chater outlined the projected changes. Subsequently in the latter part of
March 1995 SSA added to the changes proposed the Short Term Disability
Project (STDP), and the Senior Attorney Advisors Project.
SSA has projected that it will dispose of 100,000 cases in a two year
period by simply letting non judges re-review what has been done on cases
at the earlier stages while they are awaiting hearing before an
administrative law judge. The Short Term Disability Project (STDP)
empowers staff attorneys and analysts employed in the agency to perform
functions heretofore exclusively those of APA protected administrative law
judges, even granting to them unheard of adjudicatory authority to issue
revised or modified reconsideration determinations, after a request for
hearing before an administrative law judge has been filed.
CONCLUSION
The role of the administrative law judge is as all can see extremely
important and essential to the continued confidence of the citizenry in it's
government. Thus, any proposals to change how any agency does
business, particularly when it involves the utilization of administrative law
13 .A Proposal to Restructure the Social Security Administration Disability
Determination Process," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Social Security of
the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 103rd
Congress, Second Session, April 14, 1994. Serial 103-81, U.S. Gov. Printing
Office 82-549 CC.
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judges or as in the proposals contained in the re-engineering plans of SSA,
delegations of authority to others that formerly was exclusively that of the
administrative law judges, must be examined carefully.
As administrative law judges our responsibility continues to guard
against undermining of the APA protected process, not for our benefit. but
for the benefit of the citizenry that it was passed to protect. As Senator
Cohen stated the responsibility of the judges does not end with seeing that
benefits are paid, but to see that they are not paid, if the law is not satisfied.
My description of the problems through the years may have sounded
more like a story of the devolution of the position. It is however a fact that
the authority of the administrative law judges and their functions in SSA
have been dramatically reduced by agency management systems. We
cannot deny that this has occurred. Whether it should have occurred is no
longer the issue. The reality is that it has.
Although there have been a succession of administrations and heads
of the Office of Hearings and Appeals since the mid-1970s and the
previously mentioned Trachtenberg era, lawsuits, settlements,
Congressional hearings, promises of reform, plans to reform, the role of the
administrative law judge in SSA has diminished.
Knowing how important the position is, or should be, in SSA, the
problems both the agency and the judges have had in settling their
differences must be kept in mind when considering proposals for re-
engineering such as the Short Term Disability Project and the Adjudication
Officer proposals.
It is obvious that the primary motive of many of the new proposals you
will be examining is to move more cases, but the way they are going to be
moved must concern us.
Will it move the cases they project? Will the review process be fair ?
How will these proposals impact the authority of the administrative
judiciary in SSA?
Will SSA judges continue to have the authority to exercise the dual
responsibility, mentioned by Senator Cohen?
Do these proposed changes signal the relegation of the administrative
law judge position in SSA to a lesser role. I hope that I have supplied you
with information that will help you better understand how we have come to
the place we are today and that it will assist you in your discussions.
Addendum Update
Since the above presentation was made in April 1995, the regulations
pertaining to the Short-Term Disability Project program have been
implemented by SSA. Presently Senior Staff Attorneys in the hearing
offices in OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS are performing many of
the functions formerly performed only by administrative law judges.
They are empowered to make fully favorable decisions without
administrative law judge oversight. The agency has attempted to justify its'
position in gMng adjudicative authority to such senior staff attomeys on the
basis that cases can be allowed at any stage by the agency, even after
request for hearing before an administrative law judge has been filed.
Unfortunately, some of the practices being employed give rise to a real
danger of bias towards disposition of case numbers by allowing them to
meet certain predetermined numerical targets.
The agency also admitted that for some time it has not been assigning
cases in strict rotation, as required by the APA and the Bono Settlement. It
offers as explanation that such change in assignment policy came about
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after "appropriate consultation" with the administrative law judges, implying
that it is permissible.
In June 1995, SSA published proposed regulations to establish the
Adjudication Officer position thereby further transferring adjudicatory
........., a.. ... U ,lui,, Ion,, authority from the administrative law judges to this
position. Significantly, the role of the AO is performed without control or
supervision of the administrative law judges, before the case is assigned to
a judge. SSA has given every indication it intends to go forward as well with
implementation of the AO position.
in August 1995, the Subcommittee of Social Security held hearings at
which "invited witnesses" testified. In their opinion, the appeals system
presided over by the administrative law judges had failed, or words to that
effect. They proposed that hearing procedures should be placed at the
state agency levels, and presided over by employees of the state agencies,
who are neither lawyers, administrative law judges, or APA protected
employees. One witness testified that "lawyers" could not be "truth seekers"
as they are advocates for one position or the other.
On August 9, 1995, the American Bar Association, at it's annual
meeting held in Chicago, Illinois, passed a resolution calling on Social
Security to continue APA hearings and the protected position of the
Administrative Law Judge
H.R. 2020, the U.S. Appropriations Bill which recently passed the
House, contains provisions in it that would defund the Office of Personnel
Management and permit qualification and hiring of administrative law
judges in Federal government by the hiring agencies themselves. This
would require an amendment of the APA which presently requires outside
Fall 1995 Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law Judge
qualification of applicants for administrative law judge positions,
independent of agency screening or qualification.
It is clear from the above that the future of the Federal Administrative
Judiciary in SSA is being challenged on all fronts. All organizations
representing Administrative Law Judges should watch these developments
closely to do what they can to prevent dismantling of the APA protection
now existing in the Federal Judiciary.
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